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Abstract A question, long discussed by legal scholars, has recently provoked a
considerable amount of philosophical attention: ‘Is it ever appropriate to base a
legal verdict on statistical evidence alone?’ Many philosophers who have consid-
ered this question reject legal reliance on bare statistics, even when the odds of error
are extremely low. This paper develops a puzzle for the dominant theories con-
cerning why we should eschew bare statistics. Namely, there seem to be compelling
scenarios in which there are multiple sources of incriminating statistical evidence.
As we conjoin together different types of statistical evidence, it becomes increas-
ingly incredible to suppose that a positive verdict would be impermissible. I suggest
that none of the dominant views in the literature can easily accommodate such
cases, and close by offering a diagnosis of my own.
Keywords Proof paradox  Legal proof  Statistical evidence  Blue Bus problem 
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1 Introduction
A question, long discussed by legal scholars, has recently provoked a considerable
amount of philosophical attention: ‘Is it ever appropriate to base a legal verdict on
statistical evidence alone?’ The dominant view is that merely statistical evidence
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cannot provide a proper basis for a legal verdict, even when the odds of error are
extremely low.1
Here are some classic cases—sometimes referred to as ‘proof-paradoxical’
scenarios2—which illustrate the intuitive case against imposing sanctions on the
basis of bare statistics:
Blue Bus. A bus negligently causes injury to a pedestrian, but it is not known which
company the bus belongs to. On the route where the accident occurred, the Blue
Bus Company runs 75% of the buses. There is no further information available to
settle which company the bus belongs to. [Adapted from Tribe 1971].
Gatecrasher. The organizers of the local rodeo decide to sue John for
gatecrashing their event. Their evidence is as follows: John attended the
Sunday afternoon event—he was seen and photographed on the main ranks
during the event. No tickets were issued, so John cannot be expected to prove
that he bought a ticket with a ticket stub. However, while 1000 people were
counted in the seats, only 300 paid for admission. [Presentation adapted from
Blome-Tillmann forthcoming; original case due to Cohen 1977]
Prisoners. One hundred prisoners are exercising in the prison yard. Ninety-
nine of them suddenly join in a planned attack on a prison guard; the
hundredth prisoner plays no part. There is no evidence available to show who
joined in and who did not. [Adapted from Redmayne 2008]
The ‘standard’ intuition is that it would not be appropriate in these cases to impose
civil or criminal sanctions on the basis of the inculpatory statistical evidence. Such
intuitions raise issues with important theoretical and practical ramifications for the
law. The question of how to treat bare statistics impinges upon debates about the
nature of legal proof itself,3 whether it is acceptable to convict someone of a crime
simply on the basis of DNA evidence,4 how we should treat epidemiological
evidence,5 and the impermissibility of demographic profiling.6 And these cases are
not as artificial as one might initially suppose: the Blue Bus case has found close
analogues in real case-law.7
1 Many views are categorical. However, some extant views allow, or are silent about, the use of bare
statistics in certain restricted circumstances. I provide a comprehensive literature survey in Sect. 4. For a
succinct overview of contemporary debate, see Ross (2020a). Pardo (2019) provides a helpful
introduction to the proof paradox alongside other legal paradoxes.
2 For a plethora of other examples, see Gardiner (2018).
3 Some suppose that aversion to bare statistics threatens ‘legal probabilism’, the idea that proof requires
establishing a claim to a given level of probability. For contrasting perspectives, see Haack (2014),
Hedden and Colyvan (2019) and Smith (2020). However, one can arguably reject the use of bare statistics
without rejecting legal probabilism: we can justify tenets of evidence law that exclude or restrict certain
classes of evidence without appealing to any particular view of the nature of legal proof.
4 For example, see R v. Lashley [2000] EWCA 88; Wilson v DPP 2017 IESC 54; State v Toomes 191
S.W.3d 122, 129 for representative cases from different jurisdictions.
5 See Ross (ms) for discussion.
6 E.g. see Bolinger (2018) for an explicit connection between the Blue Bus case and issues surrounding
racial profiling. Di Bello and O’Neill (2020) provide further discussion.
7 E.g. see Kaminsky v. Hertz Corporation, 288 N.W.2d 426.
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The aim of this paper is to develop a puzzle for the dominant view that we should
reject bare statistics in the courtroom. The puzzle is that there seem to be
compelling scenarios in which there are multiple incriminating sources of statistical
evidence. As we conjoin together different types of statistical evidence, it becomes
increasingly incredible to suppose that a positive verdict would be impermissible.
This suggests that whatever is wrong with the evidence in familiar proof-
paradoxical cases cannot simply be explained by gesturing at the statistical nature of
the evidence involved. To deepen the puzzle, I show that four dominant approaches
in the literature struggle to draw a principled distinction between regular proof-
paradoxical scenarios and those involving statistical conjunctions. I close by
outlining my own view on what explains the intuitive difference between these
cases, drawing on the empirically supported ‘story model’ of legal fact-finding, and
offer some reflections on where this leaves the state of the wider debate.
2 Civil law
Let’s begin with civil law cases, canonically represented by the Blue Bus scenario.
Given that the operative standard of proof in civil law is the ‘balance of
probabilities’ (sometimes called ‘preponderance of the evidence’), a reluctance to
impose sanctions here is prima facie puzzling: surely it is more probable than not
that the Blue Company caused the accident? Even though, conceptually, it seems
like the evidence should straightforwardly satisfy the relevant standard of proof, it is
widely held that intuition baulks at this conclusion. Hence, there is apparently
something amiss with the prospect of using mere statistics to settle a civil case.8
I want to suggest that our intuitions about the legal impotence of purely statistical
evidence are not stable when we introduce multiple sources of statistical evidence.
The end result will be a case in which the total body of evidence seems to remain
purely statistical, but in which sanctioning the Blue Company is compelling.
Consider the following variation on Blue Bus, involving one additional source of
statistical evidence.
Blue Bus2: A bus causes injury to a pedestrian, but it is not known which
company the bus belongs to. On the route where the accident occurred, the
Blue Company runs 75% of the buses and the Red Company 25% of the buses.
Fresh tyre-marks are found at the scene of the accident that an investigator’s
uncontested report states were caused by the offending vehicle. All parties
agree these could only be made by a certain brand of bus tyre. A recent
insurance application form shows that 90% of the Blue Company buses have
that brand of tyre, while only 5% of Red Company buses do.
The inculpatory evidence in this case remains purely statistical—the finding of the
tyre-marks is only relevant insofar as presented alongside the reference-class (all
buses) and probability (90%) linking these marks to the Blue Company. The
8 For dissent to hostility towards statistics in the civil domain, see Krauss (2020).
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impermissibility of holding the Blue Company liable is surely less obvious in this
variation. After all, we must remember that choosing not to sanction leaves the
injured pedestrian without compensation. Still, you may not be convinced that the
evidence is yet strong enough for sanction. Nonetheless, it is apparent that we can
continue devising additional sources of statistical evidence and adding them to the
case. Consider a third variation:
Blue Bus3: A bus causes injury to a pedestrian, but it is not known which
company the bus belongs to. On the route where the accident occurred, the
Blue Company runs 75% of the buses and the Red Company 25% of the buses.
Fresh tyre-marks are found at the scene of the accident that an investigator’s
uncontested report states were caused by the offending vehicle. All parties
agree these could only be made by a certain brand of bus tyre. A recent
insurance application form shows that 90% of the Blue Company buses have
the implicated brand of bus tyre, while only 5% of Red Company buses do.
Moreover, police find a bus hubcap on the road immediately after the crash.
Only 2% of the Red Company buses were recorded as having the implicated
brand of hubcap, while 96% of Blue Company buses have it.
Suppose there is no known correlation between having the implicated hubcap and
tyre, and that neither party adduces evidence about how many buses belonging to
each company have both. Would it be impermissible to rule against the Blue
Company on the balance of probabilities, leaving the victim of the accident without
compensation? I think that this is hard to accept. However, if you are not yet
convinced, we can repeat the same strategy, continuing to Blue Busn, conjoining
ever more sources of inculpatory statistical evidence. The end result would be a
body of evidence about which a defending lawyer could force the concession that it
was all merely statistical, but where it becomes extremely difficult to suppose,
especially since proof-paradoxical cases never involve exculpatory evidence being
offered, that the case should not win the day on the balance of probabilities standard
of civil proof. To maintain uniform hostility to statistical evidence, you would have
to hold that there is no variation of the Blue Bus case in this vein that could license
finding against the Blue Company. Such a position, leaving the victim of a
negligently-caused accident uncompensated in order to preserve hostility to
statistical evidence is difficult to motivate.
3 Criminal law
To begin the discussion of criminal law, we need to first briefly dwell on the
connection between the debate on bare statistical evidence and DNA profiling.
When evaluating DNA evidence, courts rely entirely on a statistical estimate,
provided by a forensic scientist, concerning the probability that the incriminating
sample (blood, semen, hair, etc. found at a crime-scene) belongs to the accused
person. The reason that a statistical estimate is provided rather than an outright
assertion of a match is that it is well-understood that, given the limitations of DNA
sampling techniques, there is always the chance of a random match. In other words,
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given the level of detail provided by DNA profiling techniques, it is possible that the
allele-characteristics of the incriminating sample, while very similar to those
belonging to the accused, may in fact belong to some other person. Extremely
improbable although it may be, apparent DNA matches can turn out to be pure
coincidences.
With this in mind, it is not unusual for there to be cases that fit the following
mould:
DNA: Someone is sexually assaulted in a secluded park. They cannot provide
an account of the attacker’s appearance. DNA evidence from the crime
matches that of someone on file for some unrelated reason. The incriminating
evidence is the following: a forensic scientist estimates the chance of the DNA
not belonging to that person to be 1 in ten million. [Adapted from Ross 2020b]
How should we react to such cases? There is currently no consensus on this
question. Both courts and legal scholars have been much more sympathetic to the
legitimacy of cold hit convictions than philosophical commentators.9 Within the
philosophical literature, a number of theorists have explicitly extended their general
antipathy towards bare statistical evidence to endorse an outright rejection of cold
hit DNA convictions, and suspicion of conviction in such cases follows implicitly
from many extant views.10 I will return to these views below in more depth. Firstly,
however, I want to demonstrate that, just as with the civil law, there are statistical
conjunction cases in the criminal law that make forbearing from conviction hard to
accept. Consider a conjunction of a standard ‘proof-paradoxical’ case introduced
earlier, and an apparent DNA profile match.
Prisoners & DNA: 100 prisoners are exercising in the prison yard. Extremely
grainy CCTV footage shows that 99 of them attack and kill the guard. The
100th prisoner played no role in the assault and could have done nothing to
stop it. From the footage it is impossible to distinguish which prisoners were
involved. The 99 murderers escape in one direction and, some time later, the
100th prisoner escapes in a different direction. One prisoner is recaptured.
Upon testing, it is found that his DNA matches the most dominant DNA
profile found on a discarded switch-blade at the scene of the murder. The
forensic scientist estimates the chance of a random match as 1 in ten million.
I think it is hard to accept that it would be impermissible for a jury to convict in such
a case. Again, though, intuitions may vary. Nonetheless, as with the civil case, it is
9 See Roth (2010) for a wide-ranging discussion of the law. It is worth stressing that the case-law is not
unequivocal. On the philosophical side of the debate, Ross (2020b) and Papineau (2020) offer some
dissent from philosophical scepticism about bare statistics in criminal law, while Di Bello (2019) offers a
decision-theoretic argument that vindicates conviction in DNA cases, but not in short-odds proof paradox
cases.
10 For example, see the work of Duncan Pritchard and Martin Smith. When we examine other extant
views below in Sect. 4, it will be apparent why many popular theories are implicitly hostile to cold-hit
DNA convictions even if their original proponents do not consider them.
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entirely possible to continue the general strategy of conjoining further sources of
statistical evidence to strengthen the case against the accused.
While some such further variations in the vein of Prisoners & DNA would
doubtless be far-fetched, there are conceivable examples that would draw upon
entirely familiar sources of evidence. Consider the following quote from two
leading legal scholars about other types of forensic evidence such as fingerprints:
All forensic identification methods are probabilistic in nature. Traditional
forensic examiners, such as fingerprint examiners, may treat their matches as
unique, but as many have pointed out, such declarations of individualisation
are fictive. The Galton points of a fingerprint, the characteristics of a person’s
handwriting and the striations of a ballistics match all have underlying
population statistics, just like a DNA genotype […]. The fact that the
defendant’s fingerprint, handwriting or gun ‘matches’ makes it more likely
that the defendant was the source, but the inference is still probabilistic.
[Cheng and Nunn 2016: 118]
It is worth stressing that not all types of forensic evidence are currently presented in
court in the same statistical way as apparent DNA matches. Fingerprint evidence,
for instance, is usually presented in a non-statistical way—an expert identifier uses
their experience and intuition to testify as to whether two samples, in their view,
upon examining similarities in ridge-patterns, were made by the same person.11
However, this practice has come in for a fair degree of criticism. The subjectivity of
fingerprint examination, according to some commentators, compares disfavourably
with the rigorous modelling techniques used to generate DNA match estimates.
Moreover, some high-profile false positives provide grounds to suppose that such
qualitative presentations are much less reliable than is often supposed. This debate
is not my primary concern here. Rather, I simply want to note that one reasonable
way that it has been suggested that we respond to such challenges is to advocate that
fingerprint evidence should instead be presented in quantitative way, more in line
with the way that a forensic scientist treats DNA evidence—namely by offering a
statistical estimate about the probability of the incriminating sample matching the
prints of the suspect.12 While we do not yet have widely agreed upon statistical
models concerning the likelihood of random fingerprint matches, there has been
work in this direction and it is entirely conceivable that such a statistical estimate
could become the norm for presenting fingerprint evidence, taking into account the
estimated possibility of a random match.13
If this is a conceivable courtroom practice, as it surely is, then this raises the
possibility of statistical conjunction cases involving DNA, fingerprints, and other
forms of forensic evidence arrayed together to make an insurmountable case for
11 See, for example, Zabell (2005) or Evett and Williams (2015) for methodological discussion.
12 Zabell ibid. provides wide-ranging discussion of the limitations of fingerprint evidence and how the
practices surrounding it might be improved.
13 E.g. see Zhu et al. (2007) for one such attempt. As far as I understand the model, the chance of a
random match was estimated at 1 in 400,000. This is purely illustrative for my argument, nothing depends
on the exact figures.
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conviction, even though they are being presented in a purely statistical way.14 I
leave the exact details of these cases to the reader’s imagination—but, surely, it is
hard to accept that the conjunction of such evidence, including fingerprints and
DNA, could never appropriately undergird a criminal conviction. The upshot is a
simple one: if we accept that some cases involving conjoined sources of statistical
evidence can license sanction, we cannot simply suppose that the statistical nature
of the evidence involved is what explains intuitive reluctance to sanction in typical
proof-paradoxical cases.15
4 Four diagnoses of the proof paradox
The intuitive bad-standing of bare statistics, widely highlighted by philosophers
commentating on the law, can seemingly be disrupted upon considering cases
involving multiple sources of statistical evidence. In these cases, the imposition of
sanctions seems to be rather compelling. Let us now turn to consider the theoretical
importance of this finding.
The debate surrounding statistical evidence in the law contains a striking lacuna:
there is no widely agreed statement of what makes evidence ‘merely statistical’. For
example, one recent paper, coming at an advanced point in the dialectic between
two competing theories, states:
How do we, then, define statistical evidence? We don’t. We—again, in a way
that’s consistent with the theoretical literature on statistical evidence—start
with the examples. They clearly capture something intuitively important. We
then try to understand the relevant phenomena better. If we’re fortunate, we
may end up with a definition, or an analysis. Or we may not […] we may need
to settle for an ‘‘I can’t define it, but I know it when I see it’’ attitude. [Enoch
and Spectre 2019: 184]
The assumption in my discussion so far has been that taking one piece of
uncontroversially statistical evidence—where the incriminating element consists
only in the probability of the defending party possessing some inculpatory
characteristic relative to some reference-class—and conjoining it with another piece
of uncontroversially statistical evidence, still leaves us with a total body of evidence
which remains merely statistical.
One possibility is that a body of evidence involving multiple sources of statistics
possesses some normatively important property which elevates it above the merely
statistical evidence found in regular proof-paradoxical cases. It is certainly true that
in some local contexts, multiple sources of statistical evidence can have a distinctive
14 Di Bello (forthcoming) provides helpful discussion of fingerprint evidence in relation to the proof
paradox and Martin Smith’s diagnosis of why we should eschew bare statistics.
15 It is worth mentioning that it would be strange if a hostility to bare statistics led to the perverse tactical
incentive in the courtroom whereby forensic evidence could rightfully lead to a conviction if presented in
a qualitative way but the very same evidence could not rightfully lead to a conviction if presented in a
quantitative way.
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justificatory effect—for instance, having multiple sources of statistical evidence
may reassure us that the incriminating evidence does not exist merely due
to malpractice (e.g. police misconduct) or incompetence (e.g. forensic contamina-
tion). But this cannot be the whole story. After all, in cases like the Blue Bus
scenario, incompetence and malpractice are not at issue. They can even be
stipulated out of the case. What we need is a more general explanation for why
intuitions seem to differ between the multiple-source cases outlined above and the
more familiar proof-paradoxical scenarios with which we started the paper. I will
now consider four dominant theories aiming to explain what is wrong with relying
upon bare statistics and will suggest that none of them can offer a straightforward
explanation for why cases involving multiple sources of statistical evidence seem to
call for different treatment.
The four types of theory I will consider are the following:16
1. Epistemic diagnoses argue that bare statistics fail to confer some important
epistemic property—e.g. justification, knowledgeability, safety, etc.—onto
legal verdicts.
2. Moral and justice-based approaches argue that relying on bare statistics
frustrates non-epistemic normative constraints on evidence law: e.g. back-
wards-looking considerations such as respect for autonomy or due process, or
forward-looking considerations- such as ensuring legal rules have the proper
incentivising effect.
3. Likelihood theories argue that legal proof should be understood in terms of the
comparative likelihood of competing accounts, rather than in terms of absolute
probabilities.
4. ‘Phase change’ approaches argue that bare statistical evidence becomes
acceptable only when the chance of error crosses some threshold of extreme
improbability.
4.1 Epistemic approaches
Epistemic approaches to the proof paradox aim to identify some epistemic
deficiency in bare statistical evidence. There are now a number of such theories,
appealing to the absence of different epistemic properties. It is beyond a single
paper to critique the details of each epistemic view in addition to discussing other
theories, so I will here take a more general approach. I will outline and focus on a
motivating analogy characteristic of epistemic views: the comparison between the
proof paradox and lottery cases. A consideration of this motivating analogy will
justify some scepticism about whether epistemic views can explain the difference
between regular proof-paradoxical cases and those involving statistical
conjunctions.
16 These approaches may overlap. For instance, one might argue that the reason that certain epistemic
properties are important is because rules promoting them align with the proper moral constraints on
evidence law. Indeed, as discussed below, Enoch et al. (2012) relies on precisely this idea.
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Epistemologists have long been concerned with statistical evidence in the form of
‘lottery propositions’, with an orthodoxy being that the highly probabilifying
evidence supporting the proposition ‘I will lose a fair and large lottery’ fails to
confer certain epistemic properties onto a belief in that proposition. For instance, it
has been popular to suppose that, even if it is stupendously likely, one cannot know
that one’s lottery ticket is a loser (e.g. Williamson 2000), while others suggest that
one lacks certain types of justification to believe that one’s ticket is a loser (e.g.
Smith 2016). This is a puzzling phenomenon in its own right: if I can’t know that I
will lose a ten million ticket lottery, how can I claim to know many ordinary
propositions about which I may be fallible? There has been a great deal of
sophisticated work devoted to exploring the ramifications of lottery cases for
normative epistemological theorising.
It has been widely noted by proponents of epistemic approaches to the proof
paradox that these scenarios bear a striking resemblance to lottery cases. While the
evidence we have in unadorned proof-paradoxical scenarios is highly probabilify-
ing, there nonetheless seems to be something unsatisfactory about endorsing it by
issuing a positive legal verdict, just as while the evidence we have that we will lose
a large fair lottery is highly probabilifying, there seems to be something
unsatisfactory about (say) asserting or claiming to know that you have lost. Given
the similarity between proof-paradoxical cases and lottery scenarios, a number of
leading epistemologists have attempted to explain the inadequacy of statistical
evidence in the law with recourse to epistemic properties typically thought to be
absent in lottery cases.17 Some explanations appeal directly to the absence of
knowledge (e.g. Moss 2016; forthcoming, Blome-Tillmann 2017, Littlejohn 2018)
or certain types of justification (e.g. Smith’s 2018 normic theory of justification),
while others appeal to epistemic properties that have been defended as conditions
for having knowledge or justification such as: sensitivity (e.g. Enoch et al. 2012),
safety (Pritchard 2015; 2018, Pardo 2018), or the elimination of relevant alternative
error-possibilities (Gardiner 2020). Within this work, the analogy with lottery cases
is often an explicit part of the argumentation.18
To the extent that epistemic approaches are motivated by a guiding analogy with
lottery cases, they appear to face a difficult task to legitimise sanction in statistical
conjunction cases.
Firstly, epistemic approaches obviously cannot appeal to the fact that mistakes
are less likely in statistical conjunction cases. After all, from the perspective of
epistemological theorising, it is not usually taken to matter if the chance of winning
a lottery is merely low or extremely low.19 For example, whether a lottery has 100
tickets or 1,000,000 tickets is not often supposed to make a difference when it
comes to the various epistemic properties found in diagnoses of the impotence of
17 See Backes (2019) for a discussion of the other direction: using legal cases as evidence for theories in
epistemology.
18 In addition to the papers cited in-text, see Buchak (2014) for an early influential endorsement of this
analogy.
19 For empirical study of attitudes towards lottery propositions under different conditions, see Ebert et al.
(2018).
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statistical evidence: even the evidence provided by a truly massive lottery will not
make the belief that one has a losing ticket sensitive (one would have the same
belief even if one had a winning ticket), safe (there is a close counterfactual
possibility in which one has won), it will not eliminate a salient error-possibility
(i.e. that one has a winning ticket), and nor will it provide normic justification to the
belief that one has a losing ticket (it would not be abnormal in the sense of requiring
special explanation if one had a winning ticket). And, standardly, nor would one
know that one had a losing ticket just by playing a very large lottery.
A more plausible response would emphasise the epistemic significance of there
being more than one source of evidence in the statistical conjunction cases. There is,
after all, no doubt that having more than one source of evidence is typically an
epistemically good-making feature of a belief. However, as we are stipulating that
the additional evidence remains purely statistical, it is in fact no easy task for
epistemic views to explain why there is a qualitative difference between cases
involving one inculpatory statistic and multiple inculpatory statistics. To see this,
consider that is possible to derive familiar epistemic results about the absence of
knowledge—and all of the other epistemic properties mentioned—by considering
scenarios involving multiple lotteries (i.e. I do not know that I won’t win lottery 1,
lottery 2, or lottery 3). As John Hawthorne explains, our intuitions about multiple
lotteries may initially differ from those we have about more familiar cases involving
a single lottery, but these are hard to defend when subjected to sustained reflection:
It is relatively easy to get ourselves in the frame of mind where we reckon
ourselves to know that we will not win the New York State lottery each of the
next thirty years (even if we expect to buy a ticket each year). Just ask people.
They will happily claim to know that that will not happen. Now of course,
with a little cognitive effort, that attitude can be disrupted. Suppose, using
normal statistical calculations, the chance of winning the New York Lottery
each of the next thirty years was 1 in n. We might point out to someone that if
he had a ticket in one great big lottery with n tickets, he would not reckon
himself able to know he would lose in that case. Intuitions would then switch.
[Hawthorne 2003: 20]
Hawthorne’s point can be seen even more clearly if we compare huge single
lotteries with repeated iterations of smaller lotteries. It would be puzzling, if not
implausible, if our best epistemological theory had the result that we cannot gain
(say) knowledge that we have lost a lottery involving ten million players, but
thought that we could know that we have lost three consecutive lotteries each only
involving 100 players. Entering multiple lotteries of differing sizes does provide us
with different sources of statistical evidence concerning lottery-relevant proposi-
tions such as ‘I will never win the lottery’ or ‘I won’t be a millionaire next Friday’.
However, from the epistemic perspective, whether we have entered one single large
lottery, or multiple lotteries, seems to amount to a distinction without a difference.
The apparent epistemic insignificance of distributing the statistical chance of error
among multiple events seems to remain true even if we imagine that these chancy
events are somewhat different from each other—e.g. ‘lottery 1’ is a national lottery,
‘lottery 2’ is the church raffle, and ‘lottery 3’ is a workplace drawing of lots.
L. D. Ross
123
The combination of these two issues—(i) that the size of the lottery does not
explain the absence of various epistemic properties in lottery beliefs, and (ii) the
apparent insignificance of whether the statistical evidence is contained within one
source or split into multiple sources—makes the statistical conjunctions cases a
particularly sharp puzzle for epistemic diagnoses of the proof paradox insofar as
they are motivated by the guiding comparison with lottery cases.
However, it may be the case that some epistemic theories have greater potential
to explain the difference between single and multiple-source statistical evidence
cases than others. For example, some approaches, such as the sensitivity theory,
seem to have little flexibility in attempting to treat the cases differently. The
sensitivity theory requires that we only issue verdicts on the basis of evidence that is
such that we would not have issued the verdict had it been mistaken. It is difficult to
see how this condition could be met in, for example, Blue Bus3. Consider the
possibility that a Red Bus had in fact caused the accident: the evidence would
remain unchanged, insensitive to the truth, and still overwhelmingly favour holding
the Blue Company liable. Other theories involve a formal apparatus that allows
them more room to manoeuvre. For instance, the normic justification and safety
theories draw on a world-ranking framework in which there is no technical
impossibility in claiming that while a verdict based on one piece of statistical
evidence is unsafe or normically supported, a verdict based on two (or more) pieces
of evidence is safe or normically supported. The difficulty for these theories is that
they would not regard the analogous belief in a ‘multiple lottery’ scenario to be safe
or normically supported. What we are owed is an explanation for why the legal
cases outlined in this paper are epistemically different from multiple lottery cases,
when the evidence involved in each seems to be fundamentally very similar.
In sum, all epistemic theories seem to struggle with statistical conjunction cases.
But some may have more theoretical resources with which to respond than others.
Given that the rival theories have hitherto been attempting to explain the same data-
points—and all claim to be able to do so—considering statistical conjunction cases
will be a useful spur to further adjudicate between the merits of competing
epistemic theories.
4.2 Approaches concerning morality and justice
Diagnoses of the proof paradox concerning morality and justice can be usefully
separated into backwards and forward-looking theories.
Let’s begin with the former, the backwards-looking views, which roughly
suggest that relying on bare statistics violate certain duties that we have to
defending parties. These theories, while insightful relative to certain scenarios, do
not help us tell apart regular cases from those involving statistical conjunctions.
One influential version of a backwards-looking view originated in the work of
David Wasserman, arguing that proof-paradoxical cases fail to respect the autonomy
of the defending party.20 Wasserman’s diagnosis was originally aimed at the
20 Wasserman’s autonomy view has been usefully critiqued and developed by Pundik (2008).
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Gatecrasher scenario, which was among the earliest proof-paradoxical cases
discussed by legal scholars. On Wasserman’s account, treating the individual
attendee simply as a member of a reference-class ‘‘ignores the defendant’s capacity
to diverge from his associates or from his past, thereby demeaning his individuality
and autonomy’’ (Wasserman 1992: 942–3). Appealing to autonomy is one way to
vindicate the aversion to treating defending parties simply as members of a
reference-class; it would be more autonomy-respecting to use evidence that is, in
some way, individualised to the conduct of the person in question.
It is far from clear whether the autonomy-based story provides a plausible
account of the intuitive reluctance to sanction in the unadorned Blue Bus case. For
instance, as is pointed out in Pundik (2008: 318), in such cases we bring a legal
claim against the bus company rather than an individual driver. Given that the
company autonomously chose to run n number of buses on a given route, it is
unclear as to how holding them liable on the basis of statistics speaking to their
market-share fails to treat the company as an autonomous agent. However, if such a
verdict does fail to respect the autonomy of the bus company, then it is hard to see
how this failure would not also be a feature of attributing liability in the more
compelling Blue Bus3 scenario. After all, by using statistical information about the
frequency of certain tyres and hubcaps, we also rely on a reference-class. As such,
whichever way the proponent of an autonomy-theory goes on the Blue Bus case,
they lack a clear way to distinguish the standard version from the more compelling
statistical conjunction variant.
A second type of backwards-looking view, due to Alexander Nunn, argues that
we can explain our reluctance to sanction in proof-paradoxical cases by properly
considering what is demanded by the right of due process.21 On Nunn’s account, a
central prohibition that due process requires compatibility in the arguments used to
justify imposing sanctions. To make this concrete, consider the prospect of
convicting two separate persons of a ‘lone gunman’ crime. Even if the evidence
against the two was, for whatever reason, compelling, there would be something
perverse about convicting both of them. Nunn’s diagnosis is that the perversity lies
in using mutually incompatible theories—after all, both couldn’t have been the lone
gunman—to convict. The novelty of Nunn’s approach is to go further and extend
this idea to proof-paradoxical cases, suggesting that the perverse results of a
(hypothetical) simultaneous conviction of the entire inculpated population explains
why we ought not rely on bare statistics in certain cases. Nunn writes:
[I]f the same naked statistical evidence could be used to convict any randomly
selected member of a population, and the simultaneous conviction of the entire
population would constitute a due process violation (due to the mutually
exclusive nature of the crime) then the conviction of even one of those
individuals constitutes a due process violation. [Nunn 2015: 1427]
However, as Nunn himself states, the due process defence is unavailable in all
proof-paradoxical cases. For example, Nunn explicitly concedes that his due process
21 Nunn (2015: 1418–1421).
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defence cannot explain what is problematic about sanction in the unadorned Blue
Bus case. This is because there is no guarantee of error if we imagine iterated Blue
Bus cases—there is no factual impossibility (only sheer improbability) in the
prospect of being correct every single time if we held a Blue Bus responsible for
thousands of accidents on the basis of statistical evidence alone. Hence, as the due
process defence cannot explain why we go awry in the regular Blue Bus case, it will
not help us discern the difference between it and those cases involving statistical
conjunctions—there is equally no guarantee of error in the prospect of iterated
sanction in cases such as Blue Bus3.
Before moving on I should be clear that both of these backwards-looking
approaches may well be good diagnoses of specific scenarios.22 However, neither
Wasserman nor Nunn’s view provides an explanation for what is different about
cases involving statistical conjunctions from regular proof-paradoxical scenarios.
Let’s move on to forward-looking theories. The best known forward-looking
theory, developed by Enoch et al. (2012), and the one on which I focus, appeals to
the role of legal incentives.23 It is nearly platitudinous that a central role for both
civil and criminal law is to incentivise and disincentivise different types of
behaviour. From this observation, it is natural to suppose that we can consider the
proper verdicts in proof-paradoxical scenarios in light of their (dis)incentivising
effects.24
To illustrate the incentive approach, consider the Gatecrasher case. The
incentive-based approach enjoins us to ask whether the following biconditional is
true: ‘only if I gatecrash, will I be sanctioned for gatecrashing’. If bare statistics are
enough to carry the day, this comes out false—the attendee will be punished, given
the existence of enough gatecrashers in the audience, regardless of whether they
gatecrash or not. This incentivise structure is perverse insofar as rules against
gatecrashing should disincentivise people from doing it. A similar story could be
told about the Blue Bus case: were the companies involved aware of their respective
market-share, they would be aware that their chance of being held liable in certain
cases would be unrelated to their actual conduct.
What does the incentive view say about cases involving statistical conjunctions?
In a separate paper, Enoch and Fisher (2015) argue that their incentive-based
approach vindicates the prevailing legal practice of allowing convictions on the
basis of bare DNA evidence but rightly rejects relying on other types of naked
statistics. So, their view, at least by their own lights, promises to license sanction in
22 Although a thought implicit in much of the recent philosophical literature seems to be that providing a
unified explanation covering all proof-paradoxical cases is a desideratum insofar as the cases all seem
structurally similar, for our purposes we need express no view on whether this is correct.
23 For further development of this view, see Enoch and Fischer (2015) and Enoch and Spectre (2019).
24 A technical note: Enoch, Spectre and Fisher’s incentive view is a hybrid view that combines an
epistemic condition concerning sensitivity with forward-looking consideration to do with incentives. In a
nutshell, the idea is as follows: the reason that the law should care about making epistemically sensitive
judgements—they explicitly warn against epistemic ‘fetishism’—is because it promotes the right sort of
legal incentives. Elsewhere, Enoch and Spectre (2019) clarify that the incentive component of the view is
central and the epistemic component peripheral—if another epistemic condition turned out to better
capture the cases, then it should be substituted for sensitivity.
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the Prisoners & DNA case. However, what about the civil law cases? Take a
moment to reconsider Blue Bus3. Clearly it is conceivable, given that there are only
two companies competing for a given locale, that the parties may be aware—if only
in very general terms—of which companies tend to use which brand of tyres and
hubcaps. Suppose that they were so aware. If this were the case, then the scenario is
in fact similar to the unadorned Blue Bus case insofar as the companies involved
could be aware that, in a certain class of case, their chance of being held liable
would be unrelated to their actual conduct. This would mean that the incentive-view
cannot differentiate the unconvincing Blue Bus case from the statistical conjunction
variant either.
The natural response is that Blue Bus3 is simply such a recherche´ case that, for all
practical purposes, it has no incentivising or disincentivising effect. While this is
plausible as far as it goes, relying on this response begs the following question: if we
can disregard scenarios such as Blue Bus3 because they are marginal, should we
really accept the idea that the unadorned Blue Bus case is sufficiently common so as
to have a substantial incentive-changing effect? Certainly, standard rules about
negligent driving incentivise companies to avoid negligence on the pain of
sanction—bus companies should encourage their employees to drive carefully to
avoid being held liable for accidents. However, do we think that this general
incentivising effect is really disrupted by the possibility of proof-paradoxical cases?
I am sceptical. We can put the worry as a choice between two options, neither of
which is immediately promising for explaining what is different about statistical
conjunction cases. Either the relevance of incentives is purely theoretical—i.e. not
contingent on empirical assumptions about whether the potential for perverse
incentive-schemes actually has any substantial behavioural effect—in which case
Blue Bus and Blue Bus3 are on par and the view can’t distinguish between them. Or
the relevance of incentives is empirical and must be plausibly linked to the actual
psychology of actors in the relevant scenarios, e.g. the psychology of bus company
CEOs deciding on safety standards,—in which case it is doubtful that the possibility
of any proof-paradoxical case really has any substantive effect on to how agents
tend to act.25 This is not a knock-down argument against the incentive view, but it
shows that it faces some difficult questions—and requires further elaboration—if it
is to accommodate cases involving statistical conjunctions.
4.3 Likelihood theory
The likelihood theory is a revisionary approach to legal proof that, according to its
proponents, has the benefit of explaining our reluctance to sanction in unadorned
proof-paradoxical scenarios. The central claim of the likelihood theory is we often
fall prey a specific error when thinking about legal proof: namely, we focus on the
absolute probabilities of something occurring rather than looking at the comparative
25 This is not to say that a refusal to rely on bare statistics is never significant from the perspective of
incentives. For example, it plausibly matters for incentivising certain behaviour whether or not we can use
epidemiological statistics to establish employer liability for negligently caused diseases that would be
otherwise impossible to prove. See Ross (ms) for further discussion.
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likelihood of competing accounts in light of the observed evidence.26 Refocusing on
comparative likelihood rather than absolute probabilities is more faithful to the way
that trials are conducted in practice insofar as both parties to a legal dispute typically
advance their own version of events—the job of the fact-finder is to compare the
relative plausibility of the competing claims. The applicability of the likelihood
theory is easiest to see with respect to the civil ‘balance of probabilities’ standard of
proof: a claim will be proven on the likelihood approach to proof when, given the
observed evidence, it is simply comparatively more likely than the opposing claim.
(A formal statement of the increased likelihood requirement applied to the civil
standard would run as follows: find for the pursuer iff Pr(E/H1)/Pr(E/H2)[ 1 where
E is the evidence adduced, H1 is the pursuer’s story, and H2 is the defender’s story).
How does the likelihood theory help us diagnose the reluctance to sanction in
standard proof-paradoxical cases? Take a concrete example, the Blue Bus case.
While absolute probabilities seem to favour holding the Blue Company liable,
suppose that we instead compare the comparative likelihood, given the cited
statistical evidence, of two competing accounts: (i) that it was a Blue Bus, (ii) that it
was a Red Bus. The statistical evidence is equally compatible with either account—
indeed, it would make no difference whatsoever to the underlying statistics whether
(i) or (ii) obtained. So, according to proponents of the likelihood theory of proof,
merely statistical evidence (compared with, say, an eye-witness report) does not
make any substantial difference to the comparative likelihood of either account.
There is much that is insightful in the likelihood approach, but it does not seem to
accommodate the thought that sanction is acceptable in cases involving statistical
conjunctions. For, suppose that the Blue Company lawyer advanced a very specific
rebuttal in the Blue Bus3 scenario: viz. they suggest that the bus that caused the
crash was a Red Company bus that: (1) was on the route at the time, (2) had the
implicated hubcap, and (3) had the implicated type of tyres. Indeed, this is precisely
the account—perhaps the only tenable rebuttal—that a defending lawyer would
advance. In this case, the observed evidence is just as compatible with that account
as it is with the alternative account on which it was a Blue Bus with each of the
aforementioned properties. The likelihood theory thus predicts that there is no case
against the Blue Company even in cases involving multiple sources of statistical
evidence so long as a specific account is available consistent with the statistical
evidence. The same feature of the likelihood theory that enables it to deal with
familiar proof-paradoxical scenarios render it unable to make accommodation for
similar cases involving statistical conjunctions.
4.4 Phase change theory
A final theory, which I call ‘phase change’ theory after a paper due to Cheng and
Nunn (2016), argues that statistical evidence involving very high probabilities is
26 See work due to Cheng (2012) and, more recently, in a slightly different vein, by Sullivan (2019). I
focus on Cheng’s approach in this section.
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different in kind from the much shorter odds found in the unadorned Prisoners,
Gatecrasher, and Blue Bus cases.
Cheng and Nunn develop a version of the phase change theory which is neither
purely psychological nor predicated on any particular theory of legal proof.27
Rather, they show that highly probabilifying evidence such a DNA match is
mathematically different from regular proof-paradoxical cases: when we perform
logistic regression on such evidence we find that, as the chance of an incorrect
match transitions from 1 in ten million to 1 in 100 million and below, the chance of
error within a given population sharply diminishes. On their view, ‘‘[this] phase
change justifies treating DNA as different in kind.’’28
Let’s accept, for sake of discussion, Cheng and Nunn’s mathematical assump-
tions: at around 1 in ten million chance of error, probabilifying evidence starts to
undergo a qualitative change that distinguishes it from statistical evidence involving
shorter odds. The ‘phase change’ theory deals straightforwardly with criminal law
statistical conjunction cases involving certain types of forensic evidence, because it
says that reliance on statistical evidence involving such long odds as we find in
DNA profiling cases are different in kind from more familiar proof-paradoxical
cases where the odds of error are only in the order of 1/100. However, the phase
change theory does not seem to capture the fact that it seems intuitively
acceptable to sanction in the civil law statistical conjunction cases discussed
earlier. Suppose we take the chance of a ‘random match’ in Blue Bus3 to be the
chance of a given bus happening to be a Red Company bus, operating on the given
route, with the implicated tyres, and the implicated hubcaps. The chance of this
occurring is only in the order of 1/4000.29 While the chance of error in Blue Bus3 is
certainly much lower than in the unadorned Blue Bus case, it is nowhere near the 1
in ten million required for the hypothesised ‘phase change’. As such, the phase
change theory, although a compelling way to legitimise DNA cases and perhaps
other types of forensic evidence, cannot explain the difference between unadorned
proof-paradoxical cases and those involving statistical conjunctions below the phase
change threshold.
5 Error and storytelling
Let’s briefly recap. There is an entrenched hostility to basing legal verdicts on bare
statistics within the philosophical and (setting aside DNA evidence) legal literature.
This paper has explored cases involving multiple sources of statistical evidence.
These cases seem to provide a compelling basis for a civil finding of liability and, at
least when some of the evidence is forensic, for a criminal conviction. I have argued
that four prominent types of theory struggle to explain the relevant difference
27 My thanks to Edward Cheng for clarificatory correspondence.
28 2016: 117.
29 1/4 (the chance of a red bus on the route) * 5/100 (the chance of a red bus having X) * (2/100) the
chance of a red bus having Y).
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between cases of multiple-source statistical evidence and more familiar proof-
paradoxical scenarios.
I want to close by discussing a final strategy that we might use to explain the
difference between the two types of case discussed in this paper: namely, to reject
the intuitions to the effect that statistical conjunction cases are relevantly different
from regular proof-paradoxical scenarios. Indeed, I think that we may be able to
offer a sort of error theory about the apparent difference in our intuitions. However,
so I will claim, if we accept this error theory, this raises an even more fundamental
worry: it gives us reason to doubt our intuitions about the original proof-paradoxical
scenarios too.
A widely discussed paradigm concerning the evaluation of legal evidence is
Pennington and Hastie’s ‘story model’.30 The story model, focusing on how jurors
make decisions, is an empirically supported hypothesis that supposes legal fact-
finding to be driven by an exercise in narrative construction. According to the story
model, jurors attempt to ‘‘impose a narrative story organization on trial information,
in which causal and intentional relations between events are central.’’31 In a
nutshell, legal fact-finders look for stories that fit the evidence. When we can readily
construct a narrative on the basis of evidence adduced, where necessary drawing
supplementary causal inferences in order to do, and when that story is inculpatory,
we are primed to find in favour of sanctioning the defending party. In a related and
complementary stream of research, psychologists who have examined the ‘Wells’
effect’—the phenomenon of juror reluctance to rely on bare statistics, named after
Gary Wells’ and collaborators’ initial study—have tested different psychological
explanations for this reluctance. One explanation appeals to ‘ease of simulation’:
legal fact-finders prefer sanctioning on the basis of non-statistical evidence to
statistical evidence because the former makes it more demanding to construct
mental scenarios indicating innocence, and vice versa concerning guilt.32 For
example, a descriptive eye-witness is more evocative than a mere statistical report,
and it is harder to imagine scenarios inconsistent with an eye-witness account than
with a bare statistical report.
This empirical research naturally suggests a reason for why cases involving
statistical conjunctions seem more compelling to us, namely because: (i) they
generate an easy-to-simulate inculpatory narrative in the mind of the assessor, and
(ii) they make it more demanding to simulate an exculpatory narrative. Let me
explain.
Regular proof-paradoxical cases are generally lacking in narrative structure: e.g.
they simply tell us that it was likely that the bus was blue, or that the gatecrasher
lacked a ticket, and that is all there is to it. Conversely, the extra complexity of
statistical conjunction cases makes them more evocative, and require us to take
more steps to imagine that the defending party was not at fault. Take Blue Bus3. In
30 See Pennington and Hastie (1991, 1992, 1993) for a representative sample of papers outlining both the
theoretical and empirical support for the story model.
31 Ibid. (1992: 189).
32 See Wells (1992) for the original study and Neidermeier et al. (1999) for further empirical work in
support of the ease of simulation hypothesis.
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the version discussed, there is statistical evidence concerning not only the frequency
of buses on a route, but also concerning a hubcap found at the scene, and tyre marks
found on the road. This is ripe for the imposition of a narrative structure; it is easy to
imagine a blue bus causing a crash, that bus making marks on the road, and a
hubcap belonging to that bus coming off and rolling into the bushes. It is easy to
imagine a nexus of physical causality that explains all of the adduced evidence just
by imposing a temporal narrative structure onto the evidence. Moreover, rejecting
that narrative takes more cognitive effort than the original Blue Bus case. We must
assume that not only has one improbable coincidence occurred, but three, or more,
at different points in the story. This, I think, makes for a central difference between
cases involving statistical conjunctions and those involving only one source of
evidence. We treat the former as a compelling story, the rejection of which would
require the effortful adoption of a sceptical stance at multiple points of the narrative.
This makes error seem like a much more distant possibility than in cases involving
single-source statistical evidence, and primes us to find against the defending party.
This amounts to an entirely psychological diagnosis of why we are more inclined
to find sanction acceptable in statistical conjunction cases. The harder question is
this: what is the normative relevance of this psychological account? I suggest that
our psychological diagnosis can facilitate an argument for a sort of error theory, i.e.
the claim that our intuitions about statistical conjunction cases should not be trusted.
Suppose we begin, naturally enough, from a veritistic perspective—what relevance
does narrative and ease of simulation have for getting to the truth? Certainty, the
ease of imposing narrative structure onto evidence and simulating an exculpatory
scenario can be a helpful heuristic for truth. The mind has a general facility for
discerning the plausible from the implausible. However, in other cases, the role of
evocative narratives in generating judgements of plausibility and implausibility can
amount to a cognitive bias. Take the intuitive shiftiness noted by Hawthorne earlier,
that people are initially more inclined to say that they know they won’t win multiple
smaller lotteries but not that they won’t win a single giant lottery where the
probability of winning is identical to winning multiple times in a row. The prospect
of winning the lottery multiple times in a row is an evocative and incredible-
sounding story—it appears implausible to the imagination, and involves accepting
that multiple incredible things will happen in a row. So, we are apt to discount the
possibility and reject the attribution of knowledge. But, from the perspective of
veritistic judgement, we should evidently not treat that possibility any differently
from the judgement about losing the single larger lottery. To do otherwise is to be
led astray by the imagination and fall prey to a type of bias. Framed this way, we
might worry that the same bias is manifesting itself when we find statistical
conjunction cases more persuasive than those involving a single source of evidence.
While these thoughts are somewhat preliminary, we can see the outlines of an
error theory that would recommend the following conclusion: to the extent that
intuitions about statistical conjunction cases differ from unadorned proof paradox-
ical scenarios, they should not be trusted—rather, if we are concerned with
accuracy, we would be better off discounting the fact that the statistical evidence is
dispersed over multiple sources. If we accepted such a theory, then one might
suppose that the theories discussed earlier in the paper actually face no issues with
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statistical conjunction cases. Indeed, we might suppose that it is actually a mark in
their favour if they treat single and multiple-source bare statistics on par. According
to this error theory, once we understand the aetiology of the intuitions involved, we
should not be perturbed about refusing to sanction even in cases involving the
conjunction of many different types of statistical evidence.
However, this error theory is in fact double-edged. The same psychological
diagnosis that undermines intuitions about statistical conjunction cases can also
undermine intuitions about the original proof-paradoxical scenarios. A standard
lesson drawn from the proof paradox is that there is a disfavourable contrast
between bare statistical evidence (bad) and familiar non-statistical evidence such as
eye-witness testimony (good). It is easy to see why relying on the error theory
outlined above is problematic for those who wish to uphold our intuitions about the
original proof paradox. Unlike bare single-source statistics, eye-witness accounts
are narratively rich and it is cognitively demanding to generate consistent
exculpatory accounts. The very same idea, that we should not allow the ease of
simulation heuristic to lead us astray when evaluating evidence from a veritistic
perspective, can also be used to call into question the disfavourable contrast
between statistical and non-statistical evidence. So, to the extent that an error theory
can challenge intuitions about cases involving statistical conjunctions, the intuitions
about the original proof paradox are open to challenge on the same basis.
To close, it is worth pointing out that one might attempt to find some
consideration that could vindicate treating narratively rich evidence differently even
if our intuitions about it are driven by a potentially bias-inducing heuristic. One easy
but perhaps not altogether satisfying reason for the law to prefer narratively rich
evidence follows from the importance of the perception of fairness in the law. One
role for any legal system is to inspire public confidence in its workings. This
explains, for example, why cases can be overturned for being decided in an
apparently biased way even if it is accepted that there was in fact no actual bias
tainting the decision.33 If we can simply note that a normal observer does find
sanction reasonable in statistical conjunction cases but not in unadorned proof-
paradoxical scenarios, then this creates its own reason to treat the cases differently.
Appearances matter in the law, even if we cannot provide an underlying theory to
vindicate the difference between the unadorned proof paradoxical cases and those
involving statistical conjunctions. This is perhaps a somewhat conservative and
quietist response to the puzzle outlined in this paper. If we want a better solution, we
must throw down the gauntlet to those hostile to bare statistics—what is different
about cases involving multiple sources of statistical evidence?34
33 One of the most striking examples in modern times is R v Bow Street Metropolitan Stipendiary
Magistrate, ex parte Pinochet Ugarte (No 2) [2000] 1 AC 147. The extradition of Augusto Pinochet from
the United Kingdom to Spain was set aside because the spouse of one of the judges had links to Amnesty
International, an intervener in the case.
34 Anonymous reviewers and Dario Mortini provided instructive written feedback on this paper—my
thanks to them.
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